


**Keywords:**

Energy communities, demand response, dynamic pricing, inverse optimisation, robust optimisation

**Benjamin Fritz**  
Pierre Pinson

**Problem setup**



**Uncertainty quantification**



Assume we have a training dataset  $\mathcal{D} = \{\pi_{(i)}, X_{(i)}^*\}_{i \in [D]}$

**STEP 1**

**Inverse Optimisation:** Find the  $\hat{\theta}$  that optimally fits the response  $X$  to each point in the data  $\mathcal{D}$  [1].

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{maximize}_{\{x_b\}_{b \in \mathcal{B}}} \sum_{b \in \mathcal{B}} u_b(\theta) x_b - \pi X \\ & \text{subject to } 0 \leq x_b \leq \frac{\bar{X}(\theta) - \underline{X}(\theta)}{|\mathcal{B}|} \\ & \sum_{b \in \mathcal{B}} x_b = X \end{aligned}$$

**STEP 2** **Conformal Prediction:** Use validation dataset to calibrate the interval  $[\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$  at a user-defined confidence (e.g. 80%) [2].



**Robust price-setting problem**

Assume **DA prices** are sent to **uncontrollable** agents the day before, while **controllable** agents are used for **real-time balancing**.

→ Solve a two-stage robust optimisation problem to find: What is ...

... the best set of DA dynamic price signals  $\{\pi_t^{DA}\}_{t \in [0:24]}$  ...

... assuming the worst-case realisation of  $\theta$  ...

... for the next-day real-time market clearing?

$$\max_{\{\pi_t^{DA}\}_{t \in [0:24]}} \min_{\theta \in [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]} \max_{\{x_n\}_{n \in \mathcal{N}}} SW(\{\pi_t^{DA}\}_{t \in [0:24]}, \theta, \{x_n\}_{n \in \mathcal{N}})$$

To solve this problem, we used the **column-&-constraint generation** algorithm proposed in [3].


**Market clearing (if we had full information)**

1. Solve **primal** problem → get power setpoints for  $\mathcal{N}$

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{maximise}_{\{x_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{N} \cup \mathcal{M}}} \sum_{n \in \mathcal{N}} u_n(x_n) + \sum_{m \in \mathcal{M}} u_m(x_m) \leftarrow \text{Utility functions} \\ & \text{subject to } x_i \in \mathcal{X}_i \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{N} \cup \mathcal{M} \leftarrow \text{Individual constraints} \\ & \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N} \cup \mathcal{M}} x_i = 0 \leftarrow \text{Coupling constr. (copper-plate)} \end{aligned}$$

2. Solve **dual** problem → get prices for  $\mathcal{M}$  (assuming convexity)

**Market clearing (s.t. behavioural uncertainty)**



If we **overestimate** the marginal utilities:  
→  $\mathcal{M}$ -agents will be charged too much!

If we **underestimate** the marginal utilities:  
→ CM will incur financial loss!

In both cases: **social welfare loss!** ☹️


**Energy Community Case Study:**

- $\mathcal{N} =$  x25 x5
- $\mathcal{M} =$  x50

Single DA market clearing using different approaches:

**Price of robustness**  
→ Robust approach is outperformed by point-forecast

**Preliminary results**



**References**

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[3] B. Zeng and L. Zhao, 'Solving two-stage robust optimization problems using a column-and-constraint generation method', *Operations Research Letters*, vol. 41, no. 5, pp. 457-461, Sep. 2013

**How to optimally operate an energy community in which only some of its participants are controllable & observable?**